by Marianne Worthington

Today I have stood where Jefferson Davis stood and took an oath to my people. It is very appropriate then that from this Cradle of the Confederacy, this very heart of the great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the drum for freedom. . . . In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny. And I say, Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!(1)

George Wallace, 1962 Governor's Inaugural Address

     When Alabama governor George Wallace announced his bid for the Presidency on February 8, 1968, he had already achieved national recognition as an outspoken opponent of racial integration. The above excerpt from his 1962 gubernatorial inaugural speech is but one illustration of his campaign promise to "make race the basis for politics in this state, and . . . the basis of politics in this country. "(2) Six months after his inauguration, Wallace made good another campaign promise of resisting the integration of Alabama schools by standing in the school house door, if necessary. In front of a national television audience, he briefly delayed the integration of the University of Alabama by physically blocking the entrance to the university's Foster Auditorium. In August of the same year, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. referred to Wallace in his famous speech during the March on Washington as one of the "vicious racists" whose lips were "dripping with the words of interposition and nullification."(3)

     Yet in 1968, George Wallace emerged as a major third-party candidate in the Presidential campaign. As the founder, organizer and director of the newly-formed American Independent Party, Wallace secured a place on the ballots of all fifty states. He carried five of those states in the general election, won forty-six electoral votes, and drew over 9.9 million popular votes--the highest popular vote of any third-party candidate in American history.(4)

     One might wonder how this country politician, this "good ole boy" segregationist could conduct a serious Presidential campaign which made measurable inroads into middle-class and blue-collar white voters and posed a major threat to the two-party political system. One way to better understand the impact of the 1968 Wallace campaign is to analyze his rhetoric as it occurred within the 1968 political scene.

     The term "rhetoric" is an ancient Greek word meaning "persuasion." Although popular, contemporary use of the word "rhetoric" has negative connotations--bombast, emptiness, doublespeak--the original, classical use of the term is preferred by students of communication. The study of political rhetoric is the study of "public persuasion on significant public issues."(5) Specifically, this essay focuses on the rhetorical choices George Wallace made in his public discourses during the 1968 Presidential campaign. By analyzing his speechmaking, we may better understand how he emphasized and popularized certain values and ideals as well as gain insight into how he saw himself, his opponents, and his audiences. But because rhetoric does not occur in a vacuum, it is first necessary to know something about the candidate and the political climate of 1968 before analyzing Wallace's campaign rhetoric.

     George Corley Wallace, Jr. was born in Clio, Alabama, August 25, 1919. After high school, he served as a page in the Alabama state legislature before he entered the University of Alabama in 1937. Be paid his tuition by moon lighting as a professional boxer.(6) After his graduation from the School of Law in 1942, Wallace entered the Air Force during which time he married 16-year-old Lurleen Burns. He was discharged from the service in 1945, travelled with his wife back to Montgomery, and took a job as one of the state's assistant attorney generals. In 1946, Wallace was elected to represent Barbour County in the Alabama legislature. By the time he was elected the Judge of the Alabama Third Judicial Circuit in 1952, he had already achieved a reputation as an ambitious, aggressive young politician. His colleagues in the legislature had twice elected him the outstanding member. He had also introduced the Wallace Trade School Act (1948) which provided for the construction of vocational schools, and the Wallace Industrial Development Act (1952) which gave Alabama municipalities the right to issue bonds.(7) Ironically, because of the vast amount of welfare legislation he introduced, he was described by one biographer as "the leading liberal in the legislature. . . . He was regarded as a dangerous left-winger. A lot of people even looked on him as down-right pink."(8)

     In 1958, Wallace entered the Democratic primary for the governorship of Alabama. He was smartly defeated by John Patterson, former attorney general and rabid segregationist. Patterson had attempted to banish the NAACP from the state and publicly accepted campaign support from the Ku Klux Klan. He led Wallace in the campaign by some thirty-four thousand votes.(9) Determined not to be defeated ever again, Wallace forever adopted his unwavering stance on segregation. In 1962, this pose was coupled with his one-man war against big government and federal intervention. Wallace soon moved his family into the governor's mansion after he received the largest number of votes of any gubernatorial candidate in Alabama's history.(10)

     Wallace entered the race for the President for the first time in 1964. As a Democratic candidate, he selected three of the primaries to test his voter support in the northern states. He captured 33.9 percent of the popular vote in Wisconsin, 29.9 percent of the vote in Indiana, and 42.7 percent of the vote in Maryland.(11) When Wallace could not legally succeed himself as governor in 1966, his wife Lurleen (already diagnosed with cancer) entered the race. She won an overwhelming victory, and George Wallace had preserved his power base in Alabama.

     In the meantime, Wallace forged ahead to the 1968 Presidential campaign. His old campaign slogan "Stand Up For Alabama" was revised to "Stand Up For America." Although generally regarded as a bigot, a racist, and a "fighting" politician who sought the Presidency by questionable means, he was popular with many audiences. The nation was forced to take a serious view of the Wallace candidacy despite his prized epithets of "pointy-headed intellectuals," "government pussy-footing," and "sissy-britches welfare people."(12) Wallace's hard-hitting rhetoric, however, seemed conducive to the political atmosphere of 1968.

     Few would deny that 1968 was one of America's most tumultuous years. Some of the major social and political controversies that contributed to the country's heated state when George Wallace entered the Presidential race are outlined below.

     First, the Civil Rights Act had been passed and signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. The increasing unrest in the black community had forced the nation to reconsider its stance on segregation. Yet black people continued to be intimidated, coerced and murdered. When Martin Luther King, Jr. organized the famous protest march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965, George Wallace refused to meet him when the marchers reached Montgomery. In 1966, Stokely Carmichael switched his loyalty from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to the Black Panthers. From 1965-1968, sections of large cities were burned and looted. During the July, 1967, riots in Detroit, 40 people were killed, 2,000 were injured, and 5,000 were left homeless through burning and looting. President Johnson called in 4,700 federal paratroopers and 8,000 National Guardsmen to quell the riots.(13) By 1968, urban race riots were common occurrences throughout the country.

     Second, despite official pronouncement to the contrary, the war in Vietnam was not being won and victory was not imminent. In January, 1968, the Tet Offensive illustrated that communist forces were deeply entrenched in Southeast Asia. The body counts of young American soldiers had risen to the hundreds, and the public had grown impatient with President Johnson's conduct in dealing with Vietnam. (14)

     Finally, the eruption of angry young people spread from the Haight-Ashbury community in San Francisco to the rest of the nation. The members of this counter-culture revolution were popularly known as hippies or flower children and espoused lifestyles radically different from their elders. Cultural forces such as rock music, drugs, sexual freedom, guerrilla theatre, and underground newspapers helped young people find common identities. Anti-establishment heroes such as Timothy Leary, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman were key figures in promoting the conflict of counter-culture vs. established-culture. In October of 1967, for example, over 100,000 young people participated in the antiwar march on the Pentagon where flower children stuck daisies into the barrels of the guns of the National Guard.(15) In addition, college campuses exploded across the nation with students protesting their dissatisfaction with the "establishment," racism, and the war.

     In the political arena, Senator Eugene McCarthy emerged as the "peace" candidate and received almost as many votes as Johnson in the New Hampshire Presidential primary.(16) Senator Robert Kennedy soon entered the race, rivaling McCarthy for the liberal vote. In February, the "new" Richard Nixon mailed voters in New Hampshire a letter which portrayed Nixon as a phoenix risen from the ashes. He carried 79 percent of the vote in New Hampshire.(17) In March, Lyndon Johnson declared he would de-escalate the Vietnam war and announced: "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President. "(18)

     On April 4, 1968, civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis. On June 5, 1968, Robert Kennedy was killed during a celebration following his victory in the California primary. Senator George McGovern stepped into the race hoping to attract the Kennedy supporters. Meanwhile, Wallace was building support for his third-party candidacy by securing a place on the ballots in all fifty states--an achievement one political analyst called a "prodigious legal precedent."(19)

     The Democratic National Convention was held in late August in Chicago. As political communication analyst Kathleen Hall Jamieson noted: "As the stunned nation watched, the police beat student protestors in the streets of Chicago while inside the convention hall the orchestra played 'Happy Days Are Here Again.'"(20) After Chicago, the Democrats were severely fragmented; the Republicans led in the polls.

     After the Democratic National Convention, Wallace's standings in the Gallup Polls jumped from 16 to 21 percent.(21) The Wallace movement would provide one of the political vehicles for voters to express their rage about their own sense of social, political and moral injustice. Fed up with the country's dissension and polarization, the organization of civil disobedience groups, and the continued spread of violence and arson, voters formed a counter-movement known as the "white backlash" which emerged with the Wallace candidacy.(22)

     Probably the most significant political issues of 1968 were the war in Vietnam and the racial and campus disorder in the United States. Wallace burst onto the national political scene by addressing himself to the increasing levels of cynicism, pessimism, alienation, and estrangement; the increasing concern with law and order, social issues, and the war in Vietnam.(23) Wallace believed he was the "different" candidate--the one who had the best interests of the disgruntled, common citizen at heart. In his words:

You can take all the Democratic candidates for President and all the Republican candidates for President. Put them in a sack and shake them up. Take the first one that falls out, grab him by the nape of the neck, and put him right back in the sack. Because there is not a dime's worth of difference in any of them.(24)

     By September of 1968, Wallace could prevent either Nixon or Humphrey from winning a clear majority in the electoral college. He rivaled Nixon for votes in the South on the issues of integration and law and order. He also could deprive Humphrey of the blue-collar, Democratic voters who were fed up with the "noisy marches and demonstrations and the vehement anti-American language of dissident white intellectuals, left-wing college students, Vietnam, and poverty in the nation."(25)

     Wallace, then, took up the cause of common citizens who had been estranged from their government. His campaign centered mainly around the issues of segregation, law and order, and patriotism. He also spoke about federal interference in local schools, including busing and racial balance; the liberal Supreme Court; federal restrictions over the sale of private homes; and heavy federal taxation.(26)

     Wallace sought to conduct a "law and order" campaign which would promote the interests of the common citizen, clean up the streets, clean out Washington, and end the war in Vietnam. In trying to provide a disenfranchised people with strong new roles in government, however, Wallace faced several rhetorical problems, or obstacles, in 1968.

     First, Wallace's image was that of a racist--a bigot who stood in the school house door and openly opposed integration. Second, Wallace had the image of an extremist/ demagogue--a man who exceeded the limits of political and legal ethics in achieving his ends. Third, Wallace had to appeal to a national audience. In 1968, he still had a primarily statewide and generally Southern appeal. Related to Wallace's lack of national appeal was his lack of experience as a national politician. He had only the short run for President in 1964. Finally, Wallace faced a problem with his choice for running mate, General Curtis LeMay. When asked by reporters how he would end the war in Vietnam, LeMay replied that he would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. Wallace would spend the remainder of his campaign trying to rectify LeMay's militant stance regarding nuclear warfare.

     Wallace, then, faced a tormented national scene with a tarnished image, little national appeal, a lack of experience, and "old ironpants" as a running mate. What rhetorical choices would he make in order to enhance his credibility and qualifications and convince the voting public to elect him?

     Wallace was known for saying the same things over and over again--for employing a "message that remained essentially unchanged from 1964-1972."(27) In truth, however, most political candidates use the same themes with different audiences during the course of a campaign. As political writer John Kessel noted, a candidate's "theme song" is:

. . . made up of phrases that the candidate likes and that have demonstrated their ability to spark crowd reaction. . . . The repetition is tedious to the candidate and to reporters who have heard the lines dozens of times, but repetition helps develop a candidate's image in the same way that endless exposure to Anacin or Tylenol commercials fix the names of these products in the minds of television viewers.(28)

     Although Wallace's rhetoric was often crude and his reasoning and proof often absurd, his twisted syntax and his use of common language served a purpose. His target audiences were primarily white, middle- or lower-income citizens. He based his bid in 1968 on a broad appeal to the "white backlash" voter who consistently "opposed the values of the 'New Politics,' gave the highest priority to law and order, opposed political protest, and was unequivocally hostile to counter-culture."(29) One of his major goals was to create a sense of unity and identity with his audiences. His repetitious style, however, was not much different from his opponents. But embedded within his repetitious messages were persuasive strategies used to unify his audiences while addressing the major issues of law and order, Vietnam, and civil rights.

     The call for law and order became a major focus of the Wallace campaign. Yet the phrase "law and order" had become such a catch-all term that its meaning was virtually lost. Here, for example, is one explanation of the implications of "law and order" in 1968:

The slogan implied a distinction between property rights and human rights, between the appropriate and inappropriate means to obtain shared goals, between different social and political values and goals, between repression and change, between the rights of an individual against the demands of the community, between those who were patriotic and those who were traitors, and between orthodox and unorthodox means of protest. In some instances the meaning was, essentially racial and directed at black protest or militancy.(30)

     For Wallace, law and order meant all of these things and more; he called for an intolerance of civil disobedience at all levels, and he made sure his audiences knew who to blame for all trouble.

     Wallace held the federal government directly responsible for rioting and disorder. His hard line on law and order is well represented in the following excerpts:

Well it's a sad day in the country when you can't talk about law and order unless they want to call you a racist. I tell you that's not true and I resent it and they gonna have to pay attention because all people in this country, in the great majority, the Supreme Court of our country has made it almost impossible to convict a criminal. And if you walk out of this building tonight, and someone knocks you in the head, the person who knocked you in the head will be out of jail if you don't watch out.(31)

     In his Toledo, Ohio, address of October 3, Wallace made a similar statement:

You have seen the breakdown of law and order in your own state. And according to the decisions of the Supreme Court, if you go--if you go into the streets tonight and are attacked and a policeman knocks the person in the head, he'll be let out of jail before you get into the hospital and then they go and try the policeman about it.(32)

     In these two examples we can begin to note the development of one of Wallace's favorite themes: Us vs Them. Wallace always attempted to pinpoint the "enemies" and to set up a dichotomy for his audiences. In these instances the Supreme Court is the cause of lawlessness; the reason for the current state of civil disorder. His treatment of the Supreme Court as the enemy helped to enforce the belief of his supporters that his efforts as President would rectify the decaying federal courts.

     Another favorite enemy of Wallace were the "anarchists." As with the "law and order" phrase, "anarchists" was a similar catch-all term that could mean students, liberals, the press, militants, etc., depending on the occasion. The "anarchists" got a lot of attention from Wallace and illustrated his continued use of the Us vs Them strategy concerning law and order. In the opening remarks of his Toledo speech Wallace wasted no time in getting right to the enemy:

Thank you. I want to say that anarchists--and I am talking about newsmen sometimes--I want to say--I want to make that announcement to you because we regard that the people of this country are sick and tired of, and they are gonna get rid of you--anarchists.(33)

     Similarly, he remarked in a speech in Tennessee:

You elect me the President, and I go to California or I come to Tennessee, and if a group of anarchists lay down in front of my automobile, it's gonna be the last one they ever gonna want to lay down in front of!(34)

     In one of Wallace's more humorous quips, he identified "them" as hecklers at one of his rallies. In this example, he makes clear the social dichotomy between Wallace supporters and their enemies:

You come up when I get through and I'll autograph your sandals for you. That is, if you got any on . . . You need a good haircut. That's all that's wrong with you. . . There are two four-letter words I bet you folks don't know: 'work' and 'soap.'(35)

     Finally, we can see how Wallace connected the anarchists with the two-party political system:

The working man cannot walk to work in safety, nor his wife ride the transit system nor go to the supermarket. Nor can you walk in the neighborhood because these anarchists they kowtow to--both national parties, the members of both national parties--and the National Democrats and the National Republicans have their sails up to encourage the movement that dominates in our cities and makes it unsafe to walk on our streets. . .(36)

     The Us vs. Them strategy is evident in nearly all of Wallace's rhetoric on crime in the streets. By distinguishing between the good guys and the bad guys, Wallace forced his audiences to make a choice. They could opt for the bad guys: the federal government, the anarchists, the national parties. Or they could side with the good guys: Wallace and his supporters. By undermining his enemies, he worked to create within his audiences a more concrete dissatisfaction with the federal government, encourage voter support, and affirm his own national image. This strategy did not, however, help to rectify his image as an extremist/demagogue or address his lack of experience. If anything, this approach reinforced his extreme measures and crude tactics and did nothing to cleanse or purify his image as a racist.

     On the issue of Vietnam, Wallace's policies were less ambiguous than his opponents. Short of nuclear annihilation, Wallace called for an all-out military victory. With few exceptions, "peace with honor" phrases were not a part of Wallace's rhetoric on Vietnam. His rhetorical approach to the war issue, however, was usually less extreme than his approach to law and order. In a nationally televised speech on October 28, he said:

I'm also interested in, of course, the Vietnam war. Not only because of your children and grandchildren, and your husbands and loved one, but because I also have a son who is, of course, seventeen years of age, and the time will come that he will have to see the service in the armed forces of our country. However, I pray that by the time he is that old that the war in Vietnam is over and that he, along with those his age throughout the country, will never have to serve in any conflict involving-our nation as I served and as many of you served in World War.(37)

     In this instance Wallace does not attempt to antagonize his audience but to identify with them in at least two common ways: he is a parent with a son of age, and he is a veteran of the "big" war. Following the above statements, Wallace announced:

So that's one reason I say to the parents of this country: that we're going to wind up the Vietnam War one way or another. I sincerely hope and pray that the negotiations in Paris are successful. That we win diplomatically and politically, an honorable peace, and the American serviceman can come home.(38)

     By stirring up feelings of pride, family honor, and patriotic duty, Wallace may have hoped to soften his extremist image. Interesting to note, also, is the more quiet, calm tone evoked in this national speech as opposed to one of his rallies where he often blared that war protestors should be indicted and "put in the penitentiary."(39)

     Wallace probably needed to cleanse his harsh image somewhat since his choice of a running mate proved to be disastrous. General Curtis LeMay had announced that he would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons to end the war. After Wallace's announcement of LeMay as vice presidential candidate for the American Independent Party, Wallace's ratings in the polls dropped significantly. Many believe LeMay was the beginning of the end for Wallace.(40) In the nationally televised address of October 28, Wallace said of LeMay:

I resent the smear and half-truths and untruths about General Curtis LeMay, a man who helped defeat the Nazis and the Fascists, a man who was a war hero and helped make our nation safe not only from the Nazis and Fascists but also the Communists. . . . And some of the papers who wrote how great he was now say that if he was a great man the day before he announced as Vice President on our ticket nothing happened to make him any less the greater because he is running on a ticket supported by the grass roots people of the United States.(41)

     Also regarding LeMay, Wallace said in the same address:

General Curtis LeMay and I are going to wind this war up militarily with conventional weapons and bring the American servicemen home. And then we can spend that 25 or more billion dollars a year on other resources or other products in one country that will be in the interest of making a strong America.(42)

     In the two excerpts regarding LeMay, appeals to American pride and family honor continue to undergird Wallace's attempt to purify LeMay's image. Even though Wallace may have made a decent attempt in this speech, most saw it as too little too late. In Wallace's rhetoric on Vietnam, he worked to soften his extremist/demagogic image while solidifying his national appeal. He attempted to persuade his audiences through the use of emotional appeals based on overt patriotism. Wallace's patriotic approach may have been unique in a time of flag and draft card burning and war protests, and he probably appeased his traditional, "white backlash" audiences. These patriotic appeals, however, were not enough to recapture voter support after his choice of LeMay as his running mate.

     On the issue of civil rights, Wallace made several overt attempts to erase the racist image he had acquired through the years as governor of Alabama. Most of these statements were based solely on personal denial with no proof to substantiate his claims. Early in the campaign, statements such as, "I've never made a racist speech in my life," were common Wallace responses to charges of racism.(43) Later in his campaign speeches, these denials were embellished some, but rarely documented with hard evidence. For example, during a speech in Missouri, Wallace said: "I want to say that we've had broad support in Alabama of all races. We couldn't be a racist and get the broad support of all people of all races."(44) In another speech, he outlined the efforts he had made for the black citizens of Alabama: "We have hundreds of letters here pointing out what we have done for the Negro citizens of Alabama in the matter of our industrial-development program and supplied thousands of jobs."(45)

     Wallace may have overtly denied being a racist, but his segregationist platform was evident when he spoke about two of his favorite topics related to civil rights: property rights and busing. Wallace attempted to veil his opposition to integration by using a "freedom of decision" strategy; that is, he insisted that individuals rather than government officials had the right to decide to whom they should sell their property. For example, regarding the open housing law, Wallace said: "I feel that whenever a bill is passed which says your grandmother can be put in jail without a trial by jury because she refused to sell or lease a house to someone then the most basic civil right in this country has been destroyed."(46) By warning his audiences that the federal bureaucracy threatened their freedom to decide about their own property rights, he instilled a sense of fear about big government. Who, for instance, would not want to protect the welfare of the family matriarch? Wallace's "freedom of decision" strategy was similarly illustrated in an NBC Meet the Press interview when Wallace declared:

I am not against non-discrimination, but I am against the government of the United States in the name of civil rights trying to control the property rights of people. . . . and I feel the so-called Civil Rights Act is not in the interest of any citizen of this country, regardless of their race. I think it is an infringement upon the property right system, but I want to see that all people in this country, regardless of their color, do well.(47)

     Wallace's single-minded concern for freedom of individual decision was also apparent when he talked about states' rights. For Wallace, solutions to segregation did not lie in federal intervention, but in each state's control of its own business. When Wallace talked about states' rights, he was really talking about busing; which meant he was really talking about race relations. In Toledo, Wallace said:

If I become President, not one dime of federal money is going to be used to make you bus your child anywhere. You bus them if you want to. I don't care, but you are not going to have the federal government telling you how to do it and when to do it.(48)

     In one of his most bitter invectives on busing, Wallace stated:

Isn't it silly and ludicrous and asinine for a group of pin-head socialists theorists telling you that they are going to make you send your child out of a neighborhood school to satisfy the whim of some social engineer and say to parents, 'You don't have anything to do with it.' . . . It is freedom-of-choice only if you choose like they think you ought to choose.(49)

     These two examples are generally representative of what Wallace always said about busing. He appealed to his audiences' sense of fear about losing the right to decide where their children should go to school.

     Wallace's segregationist platform was thinly disguised in these examples, but he did attempt to use a persuasive fear appeal strategy when addressing civil rights. Wallace's disgruntled audiences felt they had no voice. By appealing to voters' inherent sense of democratic freedom guaranteed under the Constitution and stirring their sense of individual decision making, he may have reinforced their need for a change in leadership. His rhetorical choices on civil rights issues did little, however, in addressing his lack of experience as a national leader or in reducing his racist image. In fact, his racism was probably made more evident by his comments.

     In order to achieve victory in the 1968 election, George Wallace needed to purify his image as a racist and extremist, justify his choice of a running mate, subvert the opposition and the "enemies" of society, and affirm his own national standing and experience in the minds of the American electorate. During the course of the 1968 campaign, Wallace consistently presented himself as uniquely qualified to lead "us" against "them", he effectively played on the emotions of patriotism, and he downplayed his racial prejudices by articulating basic constitutional freedoms.

     Even though his rhetorical choices provided target audiences with a group identity and an outlet for expressing frustrations, Wallace was never quite able to erase his negative image or rally the votes he needed to be elected. Additionally, Wallace's own campaign became the scene of violence in many cities. Heckling often turned into fist fights, resulting in arrests and demonstrators being dragged from the halls of Wallace rallies.

     Yet his voice could not be ignored in 1968, and his political career certainly did not end. Except for a short term between 1979 and 1983, Wallace was at the helm of Alabama politics from 1962 to 1987. He also entered the presidential races of 1972 and 1976. One reporter described Wallace in 1987 as the "most formidable Southern politician of his generation."(50)

     The analysis and evaluation of Wallace's campaign rhetoric help us better understand the connections between communication, politics, and history. Speechmaking is fundamental to political campaigning. By illumination Wallace's political communication choices, we can better understand how he perceived himself as a presidential candidate and then communicated that perception to his audiences. Analyzing Wallace's campaign strategies enables us to learn about particular persuasive symbols--like speeches, debates, and rallies--and how those symbols operate within particular political contexts. Often what we see in the campaign speeches of the past are problems and issues relevant to our own times. With a better knowledge and understanding of campaign rhetoric in general and Wallace's rhetoric in particular, we may encourage public discussion with others and empower ourselves as more discerning, responsible citizens.




1. Marshall Frady, Wallace (Cleveland: The New American Library, 1968), 142.

2. Ibid., 140.

3. Great Speeches, Vol. 1, produced by Alliance Video, 1986, videocassette.

4. Frank Smallwood, The Other Candidate: Third Parties in Presidential Elections (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983), 23, 136.

5. Theodore Windt and Beth Ingold, eds., Essays in Presidential Rhetoric, 2 ed. (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1987), xvi.

6. John J. Synon, ed., George Wallace: Profile of A Presidential Candidate (Kilmarnock, Va: Ms., Inc., 1968), 9-24.

7. Lawrence D. Fadely, "George Wallace: Agitator Rhetorician; A Rhetorical Criticism of George Corley Wallace's 1968 Presidential Campaign" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburg, 1974), 39.

8. Marshall Frady, Wallace (New York: Meridian Books, 1976), 98.

9. Frady, Wallace, 1968, 125.

10. Ibid., 135.

11. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Antheneum, 1969), 345.

12. Monroe Lee Billington, The Political South in the Twentieth Century (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1975), 149.

13. Robert H. Farrell, ed., The Twentieth Century: An Almanac (New York: World Almanac Publications, 1984), 393.

14. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 582.

15. Allan Nevins, Henry Steele Commager, and Jeffrey Morris, A Pocket History of the United States, 8th rev. ed. (New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 82.

16. Gordon C. Bennett, "The Heckler and the Heckled in the Presidential Campaign of 1968," Communication Quarterly 27 (Spring 1979): 29.

17. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Campaign Advertising (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 227-228.

18. lbid., 223.

19. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election (Lexington, Ma: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), 91.

20. Jamieson, Packaging the Presidency, 225.

21. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election, 87.

22. James E. Combs, Dimensions of Political Drama (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing, 1980), 178.

23. Michael J. Robinson, "Television and the American Politics: 1956--1976," Public Interest 48 (Summer 1977): 27.

24. George C. Wallace, Stand Up For America (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 212.

25. Paul F. Boller, Jr., Presidential Campaigns (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 324.

26. Billington, The Political South, 148.

27. Richard D. Raum and James S. Measell, "Wallace and His Ways: A Study of the Rhetorical Genre of Polarization," Central States Speech Journal 25 (Spring 1974): 29.

28. John H. Kessel, Presidential Campaign Politics: Coalition Strategies and Citizen Response, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), 136.

29. Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, Leadership and Change: The New Politics and the American Electorate (Cambridge, Ma: Winthrop Publishing, 1976), 70.

30. Ibid., 65.

31. Jody Carlson, George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), 129.

32. John J. Makay and William R. Brown, The Rhetorical Dialogue: Contemporary Concepts and Cases (Dubuque: Win. C. Brown, 1972), 245.

33. Ibid., 244.

34. Carlson, George C. Wallace, 129.

35. J. Michael Hogan, "George Wallace's Political Revivalism: A Case Study in the Political Application of Religious Rhetorical Strategies" (Minneapolis: Speech Communication Association, 4 Nov. 1978), 11, photocopied.

36. Ibid., 17.

37. Fadely, "George Wallace: Agitator Rhetorician," 329.

38. Ibid.

39. Philip Crass, The Wallace Factor (New York: Maxon/Charter, 1976), 96.

40. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election, 87.

41. Fadely, "George Wallace: Agitator Rhetorician," 329.

42. Ibid.

43. George C. Wallace, Hear Me Out (Anderson, SC: Drake House Publishers, 1968), 119.

44. Martha Jean Womack Haun, "A Study in Demagoguery: A Critical Analysis of the Speaking of George Corley Wallace in the 1968 Presidential Campaign" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1971), 125.

45. Wallace, Hear Me Out, 99.

46. Haun, "A Study in Demagoguery," 124.

47. Wallace, Hear Me Out, 17-18.

48. Haun, "A Study in Demagoguery," 126.

49. Ibid., 113.

50. Michael Leahy, "Thanks to TV . . . He'll Always Be Remembered for Standing in the Schoolhouse Door," TV Guide, 4 April 1987, 10.