THE POPULAR
LEADERSHIP OF MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE
IN THE FRENCH REVOULTION
The revolutionary spirit of Marie Joseph Paul Yves Rosh Gilbert du Motier de Lafayette stands out in the American Revolution as well as the French Revolution. Born in 1754 in the French province of Auvergne, Lafayette's reputation as the "hero of two worlds" was at its height in 1790 with the event of the formation of the French Federation.(1) As the French government began to radicalize and support popular violence under Leftist leadership, Lafayette's position of power stemming from his reputation as a revolutionary began to decrease. Although he had been the first to champion a bill of rights in Europe and was constantly at work on the formation of a constitutional monarchy, Lafayette's position was inherently not as absolute or radical as his political opponents to the right and left of him.(2) Believing first in organization and unity of purpose in the pursuit of a more liberal form of government, Lafayette was overwhelmed by the royal court's disapproval, the Leftist's charges that he was protecting the old regime, and the outright insubordination of his own National Guard. Lafayette's moderate and popular position in politics did not stand a chance against the extreme nature of the French Revolution.
As a member of the nobility and as a hero of the American Revolution, Lafayette's nomination to the Assembly of Notables was inevitable. Lafayette returned from North America in 1782 as a youthful, vigorous hero. He was the man of the hour in France, with renown comparable to America's Charles Lindbergh after his famous solo flight across the Atlantic in 1927.(3) In America Lafayette had campaigned in the North, the South, the middle states, and after 1777, he had visited every state in the Union except Georgia.(4) A uniting force in the American Revolution, Lafayette gave Americans the foreign credibility for which they were so hungry. With his return home in 1782, Lafayette was made Brigadier General in the French Army. Between the American and French Revolution, he worked diligently at obtaining commercial advantages for America by establishing duty-free ports, reduced customs prices, and preferential terms. Amazingly enough, Lafayette secured a six million dollar loan for the Americans when the French coffers were utterly exhausted.(5)
When Louis XVI came to power in 1774, the French economy was faltering. Although he had appointed all new officials, the country's financial situation did not improve. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 had provided favorable terms for France, but their pursuits in the American Revolution had caused France to lose money at an alarming rate. Charles Alexander de Calonne, the King's new Minister of Finance, noted that it would be necessary to call the Estates General or the Notables because of the dire economic situation. This had not been done since 1614.(6) The King chose over one hundred Notables with the Marquis de Lafayette among them. He was also among the rare twenty Notables to be housed in the royal palace. The Assembly of Notables opened February 22, 1789.(7)
In the beginning, Lafayette, as Vice-President of the Assembly, accomplished very little. As the meeting progressed, however, he attacked the "farmers generaux," the rich farming class for their taxation methods.(8) On the floor of the Assembly, Lafayette exposed the way in which these landowners prospered at the expense of the lowest ranks of society. The peasants believed that they had been liberated but somehow they were still required in the rural areas to make payment or to perform seigniorial obligations. While Lafayette himself was a landowner like many Notables, sympathy for poverty classes was frowned upon at this time in the Assembly.(9)
While this disparity for the poverty classes did decrease his popularity with the nobles somewhat, Lafayette had been working on a French bill of rights with the help of America's Thomas Jefferson. In Jefferson, the Marquis de Lafayette found someone whom he could trust. Jefferson told Lafayette the truth about the dangers he faced. Jefferson's work in the American Revolution put him in a position to advise the young noble about the delicate course that he should pursue. Just two months before Lafayette presented his bill of rights to the Assembly, Jefferson wrote Lafayette:
Thomas Jefferson did, however, endorse Lafayette's declaration of rights. The document was very much like the American Bill of Rights in that it addressed freedom of speech, protection of property, the general goodwill of the government, and the right to a fair trial, among other freedoms.(11)
On July 11, 1789, Lafayette read his Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to the Assembly of Notables.(12) This introduction of natural rights in Europe helped to give him wide public acclaim as well as early prominence as a symbolic representative of the emerging revolutionary principles. Of those who did not support Lafayette or his leadership pertaining to the American-styled bill of rights, Comte de Mirabeau was the most vocal. As one of the rare Notables who was in need of money and reputation, Mirabeau maintained that the American-styled liberty was fiction, and that the Bill of Rights functioned well on paper but not in practice.(13) Only a few days after the introduction of the Declaration, the citizens of Paris stormed the Bastille. Lafayette had no time to persuade the people of the value of the Declaration.(14) With the storming of the Bastille, the Assembly of Notables hurried to make Lafayette the commander of the National Guard. While it was generally known that he was a friend to the King, the assembly appointed Lafayette to the National Militia, and the King then sanctioned the appointment.(15) This was one of the rare instances where the National Assembly and the Royal party were united. While the Assembly placed confidence in his military talent and patriotism, the King depended on Lafayette's moderation and personal attachment as a friend. Lafayette accepted the office with exceptional gratitude, anxious to promote his brand of nationalism.(16) He refused to accept a 120,000-franc annual salary, agreeing to his new position solely to service the people of Paris. In return Lafayette wanted the Parisians to respect their government. At that time, the government consisted of the Assembly, the King, the Judicial Court, and the national militia.(17) Lafayette's first act of chivalry as Commander of the National Guard was carried out during the October Days. At the beginning of October a threatening crowd had formed outside the King's residence, the Hotel de Ville, to protest the lack of bread. He proposed moving King and his family to Paris.
The volatile spirit of the crowd had already begun to influence the guards. Lafayette was sympathetic too, for the want of bread was no crime. Even though he was later censured for doing nothing to stop the incident, Lafayette understood that the revolutionary spirit had overtaken the ranks.(18) Still believing that the Guard's responsibility was to protect and maintain order, Lafayette sought to mediate between factions and unify the people through their shared political ideals.(19)
After the initial events of the October Days, Lafayette escorted the King and his family to Paris, where it would be easier for him to protect them. On the roadside between Versailles and Paris people were shouting, "Vive Lafayette!" To this, Lafayette was quick to reply that he would vigorously defend the newly championed Declaration of Rights.(20) While this was an act of treason committed in the presence of the King, it was also clear that Lafayette was leaning toward the concept of making a Constitutional Monarchy.
No one had more influence in France than Lafayette at this time. The first year of the Revolution had been Lafayette's year, because image promotion was becoming a source of influence in politics.(21) Lafayette's status as the "Hero of two Worlds" allowed him to obtain a position of dominance in 1789. While he could no longer directly intervene in the Assembly, Lafayette often brought leaders together to discuss propositions of the committee such as the famous issue of the King's right to veto acts of the Assembly.(22) The most important of these meetings was held at Jefferson's house at Lafayette's request. The correspondence from Lafayette to Jefferson notes:
The formation of the Federation was the absolute zenith of Lafayette's popularity. On July 14, 1790 the nation came together for the last time during the revolution to celebrate the Federation and the one-year anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. The National Assembly had dissolved and was re-emerging as the Constituent Assembly. As an actor in ceremony of the Federation, Lafayette promised that Republican influence and enthusiasm would not surpass that of the law and that liberty would not become license. In addition, he promised that the Guards would uphold the law in order to honor all Frenchmen. Also in his address, Lafayette christened the King, "Chief of the French," and "King of the Free People." The crowd was enthusiastic and immense, interrupting Lafayette's speech several times with great applause.(24)
The crowd was also more forgiving than the journalist Jean Paul Marat. He charged that Lafayette's speech was intended to trap and confuse the French public. Marat accused him of being a "vile flatterer" of the King, and making of the Guard into the satellite of a corrupt legislature.(25) In this sense, the charges against Lafayette were both anti-royalist and anti-republican, but as the Left (the Left being the anti-royalist clubs like the Jacobins and the Girondines) began to dominate the Assembly, the charges against Lafayette began to fall on the side of either the Royalists or Leftist clubs. Lafayette began to ride the fence flamboyantly between popular institutions and violence on the one hand, and preserving old-regime institutions on the other hand.
With the making of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly began representing the people more directly. The Assembly began to extort power from the hands of the King. Yet at this time they still preserved the royal hereditary crown simply because there were not enough radicals in the assembly to vote to entirely remove the King.(26) Lafayette truly believed that a hereditary monarchy surrounded by popular institutions was a practical form of government. While England had a history of conflict with France, Lafayette was willing to learn from English-styled government. It was not much of a surprise when the Republicans began to paint Lafayette as a would-be dictator similar to Oliver Cromwell.(27) They argued that Lafayette's leadership of the Guard and his cooperation with the King indicated a preference for power and old-regime authorities over the newly established Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen.(28) Marat again made more accusations against Lafayette. This time he accused Lafayette of closing the Guard ranks to the people and using the newly organized troops as an instrument of the wealthy. Therefore, the armed forces, which had been established to protect the rights of the nation, began to take weapons from the nation's true defenders.(29)
While the Republicans were certainly alarmed by the seemingly loyalist position of the Commander of the National Guard, the loyalists were also becoming more alarmed. They began to consider Lafayette an accomplice to crimes rather than a guardian of order. The loyalists charged that Lafayette had illegally moved the King to Paris, disarmed the nobles, and tolerated all sorts of mob disturbances.(30) They claimed that above all, Lafayette had humiliated the King. Marie Antoinette, her husband, and the court in general agreed that the Constitution and Lafayette's bill of rights violated the royal prerogatives.(31)
Despite all of this, Lafayette still swore complete allegiance to the King as a Constitutional representative for upholding order. A letter Lafayette wrote to the King in February 1790 demonstrates Lafayette's faith in the King as a constitutional representative for order. In it he wrote: "When the people and the King make common cause together, who can succeed against them? I, at least, swear to your majesty that, if my hopes should prove fallacious, the last drop of my blood shall attest my fidelity."(32) As political factions began forming to the political right and left of Lafayette, his brand of popular leadership began to fail. With the increase of people going over to one side or the other, there were few that were squarely supportive of Lafayette's image and ideal of a constitutional monarchy. In April of 1791, the revolutionary spirit overtook the National Guard, and Lafayette became powerless to stop the tide of violence. On the eighteenth of April, the King and his family were prevented from leaving Tuileries to attend Easter services at St. Cloud. The crowds and the Guard resisted Lafayette's effort to protect what he perceived to be the Royal Family's right to travel and practice religion.(33) The revolution was opening up to new social groups that resisted any single leader, especially one of noble blood.
Just a few short months after the St. Cloud event, the King and his family tried to flee Paris. Although the King was captured some hours later, radical forces in the Assembly placed the blame on Lafayette. As a friend to the King, he had promised the King would not try to escape.(34) As the Royal Family was ushered back into Paris, Lafayette gave the "no shout, no salute" command.(35) The Guards were not supposed to express sympathy either for or against the Royal entourage, so that a mob uprising would be prevented. But mob uprisings were becoming a regular event with the rise of the Leftist clubs in the Constituent Assembly.
The Champ-de-Mars Affair ruined Lafayette's popular image and his command. During the second celebration of Bastille Day, the Leftists drafted a petition to depose the King. Another petition called for his trial. A riot ensued and the mob refused to disperse. They began to throw stones at the Guards, who in turn fired upon the crowd. Fifty people were killed.(36) Lafayette's credibility as a leader among the working classes disappeared.
It was becoming impossible for Lafayette to command the Guards; he insisted that his authority as Commander should spring from the Guard's own desire for his brand of liberty.(37) He essentially wanted the Guards to command themselves; thus, insurrections were widespread. Marquis de Ferrieres, a moderate deputy for the Constituent Assembly, witnessed the members of the Guard rallying crowds to kill Lafayette and put the Prince Orleans on the throne.(38) Orleans himself had paid men in the streets to harangue the populace, inciting them to insurrection.(39) This first wave of clear resentment overwhelmed Lafayette to the degree that he resigned his command, effective in the autumn of 1791. Lafayette decided to resume an agrarian lifestyle back at his home in Auvergne.(40) In his resignation letter, Lafayette claimed that he was put into the office of Commander with every indication of popular confidence, but that "this confidence, to be useful must be universal."(41)
It was not long before Lafayette was called back into military service. In the spring of 1792, he was put back into military service in the French campaign against the Austrians.(42) Lafayette still had reservations about the loyalty of the French troops. As an admirer of the integrity of the troops in the American Revolution, he understood that no European army would tolerate hunger, nakedness, and lack of pay as the Americans had.(43) Stationed in Metz, Lafayette was powerless to mount a counter-rebellion against the Assembly, which was dominated at that time by the Jacobins.(44)
In June of that year, Lafayette wrote a letter to the Assembly explaining his horror that radicalism was spreading. He described how the Jacobins, in particular, were disturbing his effectiveness as a military leader, arguing that the clubs "rejoice in our disorders, and array themselves against constituted authorities, detest the National Guards, preach insubordination to the army, sow at one moment distrust; at another discouragement."(45) When the Jacobins met in August at the Hall of Cordeliers, Danton accused the whole Assembly of being accomplices of Lafayette. With that charge, Danton then persuaded the Jacobins not to appeal to the law or the legislature any more. Instead, he called them directly to arms. The Jacobins, as they were approaching a majority, named Danton the Minister of Justice. They seized Tuileries and deposed the King, and then Danton confiscated Lafayette's property and set a price on his head.(46)
Lafayette's ability to command was destroyed because his popularity had vanished. He wanted to march to Paris to defend the Constitution but his troops would not follow. Rather than being put into jail, Lafayette decided to flee the country. His plan was to cross Brabant and reach Holland, and then go on to the United States.(47) As a participant in the American Revolution and as a close friend to the early American political leaders, Lafayette believed that he was entitled to citizenship in the United States.(48) However, Lafayette was captured in neutral territory by Austrian troops and imprisoned. Lafayette remained in prison for a number of years before eventually returning to France to work for the restoration of the Bourbons.(49)
The Revolution continued without the Marquis de Lafayette. The nation gave way to popular violence and Leftist leadership dominated. Lafayette's failure in the French Revolution resulted from his own embrace of the intrinsic value for law and order. The French Revolution was not a revolution that utilized law and order in the pursuit of liberty. Because French people had just begun to throw off the remnants of feudalism they were only just beginning to realize that liberty was not unlimited. The popular violence of the French people was an outgrowth of ancient tyranny and the want of bread. As a member of the nobility, Lafayette was unable to contend with such base and extreme attempts to accomplish liberty.
ENDNOTES
1. Lloyd Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an Age of Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 37.
2. John Quincy Adams, Oration on the Life and Character of Gilbert Motier de Lafayette (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1835), 45.
3. W. E. Woodward, Lafayette (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1938), 134.
4. Louis R. Gottschalk, Lafayette between the American and French Revolution: 1783-1789 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950; reprint, Midway 1974), 143-4.
5. Pierre Horn, Marquis de Lafayette (New York: Chelsea House, 1989), 43-51.
6. Samuel L. Knapp, Memoirs of General La Fayette: embracing details of his public life and private life, sketches of the American Revolution, the downfall of Bonaparte and the restoration of the Bourbons, with biographical notices of individuals who have been distinguished actors in these events (New York: R. Robbins, 1825), 198-201.
7. Woodward, Lafayette, 183.
8. Ibid.
9. Louis R. Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, Lafayette in the French Revolution: From the October Days through the Federation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 229.
10. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Lafayette (May 6, 1789) The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 125-6.
11. Gilbert Motier de Lafayette, Declaration Des Droits de L'Homme et du Citoyen in The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 140-42.
12. Horn, The Marquis de Lafayette, 50.
13. Henry E. Bourne, "American Constitutional Precedents in the French National Assembly," The American Historical Review 8 no. 3 (April 1903): 475.
14. Latzko, Lafayette: A Life, 148.
15. Knapp, Memoirs of General La Fayette, 215.
16. Procesverbal des Electeurs I, "La Fayette made Commander of the National Guard," in The French Revolution: As told by Contemporaries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1938), 100.
17. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 40.
18. Knapp, Memoirs of General La Fayette, 218.
19. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 39.
20. Latzko, Lafayette: A Life, 156.
21. Barry M. Shapiro, "Revolutionary Justice in 1789-1790: The Comite des Reserches, The Chatelet, and the Fayettist Coalition, " French Historical Studies 17 no. 3 (Spring 1992):658.
22. Bourne, "American Constitutional," 480.
23. Lafayette, Letter to Thomas Jefferson (presumed date Sept. 1789), The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, 145.
24. Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette in the French Revolution, 530-3.
25. Ibid.
26. Adams, Oration, 46-7.
27. Ibid., 47.
28. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 45.
29. Ibid.
30. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 44.
31. Latzko, Lafayette: A Life, 162.
32. Gilbert Motier du Lafayette, Letter to Louis XVI (Feb. 20, 1790) Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette (London: Saunders and Otley, 1837), 426.
33. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 48.
34. Horn, Marquis de Lafayette, 61.
35. Ibid., 62.
36. Ibid.
38. Georges Pernoud and Sabine Flaissier, The French Revolution: There is always a Reporter (London: Sector and Warburg, 1961), 63.
39. Knapp, Memoirs of General La Fayette, 221.
40. Joseph Delteil, Lafayette (New York: Minton, Balch, & Co.), 1928.
41. Jean-Sylvain Bailly, "La Fayette Resigns Command of the National Guard," in The French Revolution: As Told by Contemporaries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1938), 105.
42. Delteil. Lafayette, 102.
43. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 26.
44. Delteil, Lafayette, 102.
45. Knapp, Memoirs of General La Fayette, 285.
46. Ibid., 294.
47. Ibid., 299.
48. Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds, 37.
49. Ibid., 50.