Status Quo Ante Bellum: American Victory over English

Demands in 1814-1815

By Aaron Nathaniel Coleman

            The War of 1812 had been raging two years when peace negotiations between the belligerents began on August 8, 1814, in the Belgium city of Ghent; diplomatic reconnoitering was undertaken, however, by both the United States and Great Britain, soon after the war began. Though the resulting Treaty of Ghent failed to resolve the pre-war issues, it established a peaceful and lasting status quo ante bellum (as it was before the war).

            American President James Madison, in a war message addressed to Congress on June 1, 1812, the events leading to hostilities into three major points. Those three items were British impressment of American seamen, British Orders-in-Council, and British-inspired Indian raids.

            The first and longest occurring grievance leading to war was the multiple episodes of impressment, the British practice of stopping American ships and forcibly apprehending American seamen to supply manpower for British naval vessels. Great Britain claimed impressment was used to "...search for deserters...." But Madison contended that impressment caused American citizens to be "... torn from their country, and from everything dear to them."

            Impressment was not an issue originating with the Madison administration. Beginning with the government under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789) and continuing past the Presidency of George Washington (1789-1797), the frequency of impressment gradually increased during the John Adams (1797-1801) and Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) administrations. During the Jefferson Presidency, the Chesapeake affair, the greatest controversy concerning impressment, occurred.

            British failure to repeal the Orders-in-Council of November 11, 1807, was James Madison's second reason for belligerency. That Order-in-Council, a corollary to the Rule of 1756, prohibited any type of neutral trade between or among enemy ports. The Order-in-Council also included provisos that enemy countries, their colonies, and other places where the British flag was not welcomed were considered blockaded, and all trade and products were prohibited. Under this "...sweeping system of blockades," American neutrality (regarding the Napoleonic Wars) was violated, but, more importantly, American shipping was crippled; ergo, the American economy was hindered. Britain claimed, said Madison, that the orders were "...reluctantly adopted" as a "...necessary retaliation on decrees of her enemy [the Berlin and Milan Decrees by French ruler Napoleon Bonaparte]." Even after abandonment of the decrees, however, Great Britain had refused to repeal the Orders. Instead, England "formally avowed" to continue the Orders against the United States in hopes of crushing American commerce and establishing a monopoly in world trade.

            The final grievance Madison addressed in the war message was the continual Indian raids on the American western states. Indians continued to attack and kill settlers of those states "...without any regard to age or sex." Madison attributed the persistence of the raids to the British, who traded with the Indians but prohibited trade between the Americans and the aborigines.

            In September 1812, just three months after the Congressional declaration of war, Czar Alexander I of Russia offered peace mediation between Great Britain and the United States. Russia needed the war between Great Britain and the United States to reach a quick and amicable conclusion. Czar Alexander believed that distraction by a new enemy made England unable to concentrate fully on Napoleon, who had invaded Russia with his Grande Armie the day after Madison's war message. Alexander also needed America to stop warring with Great Britain because Russia relied heavily on American trade.

            President Madison welcomed the Russian proposition without knowing the British reply, promptly dispatched recently resigned Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and Delaware Senator James Bayard to join the United States' Minister to Russia, John Quincy Adams. Together, the three men were to begin negotiations with Great Britain. However, Great Britain's reply to the Russian offer of mediation was not as enthusiastic as the response by President Madison. Lord Robert Stuart Castlereagh, England's Foreign Secretary, informed Czar Alexander that Great Britain refused the offer of mediation; the reason given stated that impressment was a "principle of internal government of the British Nation."

            After this failed attempt at peace, the war persisted without further endeavor to reach a conclusion. Then, on November 4, 1813, Lord Castlereagh sent a message to United States Secretary of State James Monroe to inform President Madison of Great Britain's willingness "...to enter into discussion with the Government of America for the conciliatory adjustment of the differences subsisting between the two states." Monroe replied that President Madison accepted the British reply with a "sincere desire" for peace.

            Negotiations, as agreed by Castlereagh and Madison, were to occur in the Swedish town of Gothenburg but, after more discussions, were switched to the Belgium city of Ghent. Madison proceeded to appoint negotiators who would "...promote the war till honorable terms are obtained." Those men were Henry Clay, United States' Representative from Kentucky and Speaker of the House of Representatives; Jonathan Russell, minister to Sweden and an expert on neutral rights; Albert Gallatin, former Secretary of the Treasury under both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison; James Bayard, United States Senator of Delaware; and John Quincy Adams, United States' Minister to Russia and leader of the American delegates. Great Britain's delegates were far less experienced than their American counterparts. The delegates included Lord Gambier, whose only claim to fame rested on his 1807 bombardment of Copenhagen; Henry Goulburn, British Undersecretary of War; and William Adams, doctor of civil laws. All three were regarded by the American delegation as mediocre, at best, and mere puppets of the British foreign ministry.

            On August 6, after waiting a month, the Americans were informed of the British delegates' arrival at Ghent. The American and British negotiators decided on the Hotel des Pays-Bas as the site for conducting business.

            At noon, on August 8, the first meeting of the delegates from Great Britain and the United States occurred and both sides exchanged full formal powers of negotiations. After completion of the ceremony, Great Britain opened the proceedings by detailing each of her three demands. The first stipulation centered on a possible discussion, only upon American insistence, of "...forcible seizures on board American merchant vessels" and the "...claim of the King of England to the allegiance of all the native-born subjects of Great Britain [impressment]." Goulburn, stating England's demands, explained Britain's willingness to discuss impressment, but, he added, there would be no settlement of the issue, only discussion.

            The second English demand concerned the territory of Britain's Indian allies. Great Britain required a permanent boundary line defining where the Indian tribes would reside. The territory would be a buffer state between the United States and Great Britain (which would ostracize around 100,000 American citizens from their country). The British considered this point a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for any peace treaty.

            The third British demand was a partial revision of the boundary line west of Lake Superior to the Mississippi River and between the United States and British Canada, establishing a "...direct [line of] communication from Halifax, and the province of New Brunswick, to Quebec." In addition, the United States was to "...keep no armed naval force on the western lakes from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior."

            Having stated Great Britain's requirements, Goulburn inquired whether the Americans wished to discuss any previous demands. The shocked Americans solicited only a few minor questions, prompting Goulburn to ask the American delegation what, if any, instructions they had been given by their superiors on the points just discussed. John Quincy Adams quickly replied that, after a conference with his fellow delegates, the Americans would, by the next day, prepare a report for the British. The English delegation acquiesced, and, in little more than an hour, the first meeting adjourned.

            The night after opening negotiations, the American delegates received a communiqué from Secretary of State Monroe. Dated June 27, the communiqué informed the delegates that after "...mature consideration it has been decided that under all circumstances... you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressments if...necessary to terminate" the war. The communiqué represented a radical shift for the Madison administration which, on previous instructions, had stressed impressment as an integral part to any treaty, but now that once important point was destined to become "an almost forgotten resolution."

            The next day, the American commissioners, as promised, gave their reply to the previous day's demand. On points one and three ("forcible seizures" and boundary changes), the American delegates were instructed to discuss. For point two (the Indian buffer state), however, they had no instructions and thought England was "... dishonorable to the United States in demanding from them to abandon territory and a portion of their citizens." Furthermore, the Americans wished to know why the United States should be expected to discuss this topic when it was never a point of contention between the two countries or even mentioned in the letter Lord Castlereagh sent requesting direct negotiations. The British unhappily conceded this point. Speaking on behalf of the American delegation, John Quincy Adams proceeded to state the American items for discussion. First, the United States wanted "...a definition of blockade and other neutral and belligerent rights"; second, "certain claims of indemnity to individuals for captures and seizures preceding and subsequent to the war"; and finally, the discussion of a "variety of other points."

            After the completion of the American topics for discussion, the British responded that since the Indian territory issue was sine qua non, and because the American delegates were unable to discuss the issue, the only course left for the British was to suspend the conference and await the orders of their own government. The American commissioners consented, and the meeting adjourned.

            On September 9, a month after adjourning the meeting to await the British delegates' orders, the Americans received a letter from the British delegates stating the importance of the Indian territory and disarmament of the Great Lakes. The American commission sent their Anglo counterparts a letter, composed on September 6 and written mainly by Gallatin, proposing that the Indian issue be settled by status quo ante bellum (as is before the war). Also included in the letter was a stipulation for a future treaty regarding the disarmament of the Great Lakes. The Americans also informed the British ministers that, if demands were not lowered, there would be no hope for peace. The British replied that they were eager to make honorable terms for both sides and shocked the Americans by stating that the sine qua non would still be in place, but no longer would any type of arrangement of a permanent Indian buffer state be required or included. With British retreat from their ultimatum for a permanent Indian territory, a major diplomatic issue, one that could have terminated the peace conference, ended in a major American victory.

            On October 19, the American delegates received another communiqué from Monroe granting permission to continue the rest of the negotiations under status quo ante bellum. Monroe also permitted the Americans to reject any British demand for land acquisition. Despite this news, which now allowed the Americans to negotiate only to defend American honor, the negotiations were far from concluding.

            One of the greatest and most heated topics of the entire negotiations occurred on October 18 over the New England Fisheries. Great Britain notified the Americans that the right "to fish on the... seas...of Great Britain in North America," as stipulated in the Treaty of 1783, would not be continued. England was willing to allow the fisheries to continue however, only if free navigation of Mississippi were reciprocated.

            Discontinuation of the fishing privileges angered John Quincy Adams more than any other English issue and far more than the other American delegates. When the Americans returned to their private chambers to discuss the British request, Adams immediately demanded that the British be allowed free navigation on the Mississippi. As soon as Adams made his declaration, Henry Clay, champion of the American west, leaped to his feet in vehemently opposition to any type of free British navigation on the Mississippi for the mere privilege of "drying fish." Adams emerged victorious in their disagreement because of an Albert Gallatin sponsored compromise allowing the Britain free navigation as long as there was a perpetuation of American rights in the New England fisheries. Included in Gallatin's compromise was the possibility of a future treaty regarding free navigation for England. Clay was somewhat pacified when the British accepted the entire proposal, even the stipulation of possibility of future negotiations regarding free navigation.

            The last major obstacle facing the negotiators concerned the revision of the boundary line between the United States and British Canada and disarmament of the Great Lakes. On October 21, the British plenipotentiary delivered a letter to the Americans stating a readiness to discuss the boundaries under uti possidetis (state of possession). If accepted, the British, because of military conquests during the war, would have possession of Fort Michilimackinac, Fort Niagara, all the country east of the Penobscot, and that part of present-day Maine that lies north of the Aroostook River. Possession of this territory would have given England direct communication between Quebec and Halifax.

            The American commissioners, following the orders of the Monroe communiqué of October 19, refused the offer of uti possidetis and would only negotiate on terms of status quo ante bellum. Thinking this unacceptable to the British, the Americans believed the negotiations would soon be closed; then came news that would alter the rest of the conference, Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough's decisive naval victory on Lake Champlain.

            After this battle, the British realized that the negotiations had to come to a rapid conclusion. The best way, they surmised, to accomplish this goal was to abandon uti possidetis and bargain under status quo ante bellum, a "thudding ...anticlimax" welcomed by the Americans.

            With the last barrier now resolved, the sole remaining task for the negotiators was drafting the treaty and securing its approval. Each side was able to critique the treaty as it was being drafted. Finally, on December 24, 1814, each plenipotentiary affixed his signature to the completed document. The proposed treaty made no mention of impressment, the boundary debate of uti possidetis was abandoned, disarmament was left to be decided at a future date, and the nearly conference-ending Indian territory issue ended with the Americans agreeing to "... restore to such tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed...in one thousand eight hundred and eleven," a minor, "nominal" concession by the United States.

            The Treaty of Ghent reached President James Madison on February 14, 1815. One day later, it was communicated to the Senate, where it received unanimous approval. The exchange of ratifications (the British Prince Regent in Council approved the treaty on December 27) occurred on February 17, 1815. The next day, the treaty was officially proclaimed and published.

            The American public received the treaty as a total victory over British forces, in part because news of the treaty reached Washington the same day as news of General Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans arrived. Thus, the treaty was acclaimed and celebrated by the entire nation. The British, relieved that a treaty was completed, were nonetheless disappointed with the terms and did not commemorate the conclusion of the war with the same enthusiasm as did the Americans.

            The Treaty of Ghent failed to answer any prewar issue President Madison addressed in his war message nearly three years earlier; yet, the treaty was not a failure. The American delegation was able to fend off harsh British demands, defend American honor, and favorably end a war that nearly bankrupted the country, despite witnessing few American military victories. The "Peace of Christmas Eve" elevated the young American Republic to the stature of being "courted" by the major European powers and helped to establish a delicate, but lasting peace with Great Britain that eventually developed into a solid partnership.